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require the State Engineer -to re-notice the applications and reopen
the protest period. The court reasoned that voiding the State
Engineer's ruling and preventing him from taking further action
would be inequitable to SNWA and applicants should not be
punished for the State Engineer's failure to follow his statutory duty.
The court further reasoned that it would be inequitable to the
protestants if the State Engineer's inaction over a fourteen-year
period resulted in the application's approval.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying
the petition for judicial review and remanded the matter to the
district court with directions to further remand the matter to the
State Engineer for further proceedings.
Toby Weiner

OREGON
Pete's Mountain Homeowners Ass'n v. Or. Water Res. Dep't, 238
P.3d 395 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that members of a local
homeowner association, who owned water rights in Clackamas
County, had standing to seek judicial review of the Oregon Water
Resources Department's final order approving an application to
amend a water company's water right permit).
Pete's Mountain Water Co., Inc. ("the water company") owned a
water right permit in Clackamas County that authorized the
withdrawal of groundwater for group domestic use and limited
irrigation on roughly 147 acres of land. In 2004, the water company
applied to the Oregon Water Resources Department ("the
department") to amend its water right permit to expand the
authorized place of use. Interestingly, the amendment application
did not request to change the amount of homes that the water
company would serve.
In late 2006 and early 2007, pursuant to chapter 537 of the
Oregon Revised Statutes, Pete's Mountain Homeowners Association
and a number of local residents (collectively referred to as "the
homeowner association") filed comments with the department
The homeowner
opposing the water company's application.
association alleged that approval of the application would fail to
protect the public interest and neglect existing groundwater rights
held by association members and local residents. Neither chapter 536
nor chapter 537 of the Oregon Revised Statutes required the
department to hold a contested case hearing. Without further action,
the department issued a final order approving the water company's
application.
The homeowner association -then filed a petition for judicial
review with the Clackamas County Circuit Court. The water company
subsequently intervened and moved to dismiss the petition asserting
that the homeowner association lacked standing to seek review. The
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trial court agreed and granted the water company's motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals considered whether the
homeowner association had standing to seek judicial review of the
department's final order approving an application to amend a water
right permit. The legislature determines the status or qualification
Accordingly, to determine the
required to establish standing.
meaning of the statute, the court examined the statutory language in
the context of relevant legislative history.
The water rights statute states that any "party affected" by a final
order may appeal the order to the circuit court. However, the statute
does not define the term "party." The water company argued that the
court should interpret "party" to have a limited meaning. Specifically,
the water company alleged that "party" referred only to persons to
whom a state agency has granted formal status as a party to the
proceeding. In contrast, the homeowners association asserted that
the court should interpret "party" as a person who the final order
affected, but who had not necessarily achieved formal status in the
agency proceedings.
After a close examination of the statute and its context, the court
found that the water company's limited definition of "party" was
somewhat supported. Notably, another provision of the water rights
statute, the contested case provision, utilized "party" to indicate
persons with formal status only. The court reasoned that the water
company's assumption of consistency in the legislature's use of terms
in the same statute was permissible. On the other hand, the court
found that other provisions of the statute suggested that the
legislature intended a different meaning of the term "party" in the
provision that relates to judicial review of orders in uncontested cases.
Accordingly, the court found that the homeowners association's
definition of "party" was also plausible.
Given a lack of pertinent legislative history available to resolve the
conflict, the court determined to resolve the ambiguity between the
two competing and reasonable constructions of the term "party" by
utilizing two cannons of construction: (1) the absurd results cannon,
and (2) the avoidance cannon. Under the absurd results cannon,
when one construction would lead to an absurd result and the other
would not, the court will favor the latter. Here, the water company's
interpretation indicated that a person that a final order adversely
affects would be required to obtain a declaration that he, she, or it
was a party to a proceeding. However, no statutory provision existed
for obtaining such a declaration and there was no such requirement
that such a proceeding occur. Thus, the court reasoned that the
water company's reading of the statute would make little sense.
Under the avoidance canon, if there is a plausible argument that
one of the competing constructions would render a statute
unconstitutional, the court will favor the other construction. Here,
the statute provided for no process whereby a person could obtain
recognition as a formal party. Accordingly, the court reasoned that if
it adopted the water company's definition, the homeowners
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association could face the prospect of being unable to obtain judicial
review of department orders that adversely affect its property rights.
Considering the outcomes under the two canons of construction,
the court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition
for judicial review on the ground that the homeowners association
was not a "party" within the meaning of the water rights statute.
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the trial court's
decision.
Molly Callender

WASHINGTON
Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan Cnty., 238 P.3d 1129 (Wash. 2010)
(holding that statutory immunity does not apply where the cause of
action is based solely on constitutional grounds and that the common
enemy doctrine does not bar inverse condemnation claims for
property damage caused *by water flowing through a natural
watercourse).
In 1999, Okanogan County ("County") implemented major
improvements to the Sloan-Witchert Slough Dike ("Dike") on the
Methow River ("River"). Afterwards, a Washington State Department
of Ecology hydrogeologist ("State hydrogeologist") submitted a
memorandum to the County shoreline permit coordinator, explaining
that the improvements cut off the River's natural overflow channels.
He maintained that the cut off would compress more flood flow into
the main channel and reduce that natural flood conveyance capacity
of the river.
In 2002, the River flooded and washed away a substantial portion
of private real property, including the Fitzpatrick and Sturgill's
("owners") private log cabin. The owners had built the cabin outside
the 100-year flood level. They alleged that the Dike caused the River
to change course and wash away their property. The owners filed a
complaint with the Douglas County Superior Court ("trial court")
against the County and the State of Washington ("State"). The
complaint contained claims for inverse condemnation, trespass,
negligence, and wrongful injury or waste to property. An inverse
condemnation claim is an action alleging a governmental taking or
damaging to recover the value of property that the government
appropriated in fact, with no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain. The elements of an inverse condemnation claim include: (1)
a taking or damage (2) of private property (3) for public use (4)
without just compensation (5) by a governmental entity that has not
instituted formal proceedings.
The County and State moved for summary judgment, citing the
common enemy doctrine and statutory immunity, which the trial
court granted. On appeal, Division Three of the Washington Court
of Appeals ("court of appeals") reversed the trial court, holding that

